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Abstract
This paper does not seek to evaluate whether decentralisation of the implementation
of Art.  81 ECT is desirable but simply analyses how the network of enforcers
envisaged in the White Paper would operate.  We identify two issues.  We observe
that in the proposed framework, simultaneous enforcement by several authorities is
likely to occur and that each member states will have little incentive to take into
account in its decision the interests of other member states.   We show that such
system of enforcement can have a “disintegrating effect”, to the extent that it does not
allow for a balancing between positive and negative net benefits across member
states.  We suggest that in order to avoid these effects, some co-ordination between
the members of the network should be organised.   In particular, we advocate the re-
emergence in the intra-EC context of a 'positive comity' obligation and we suggest
that a formal procedure for co-ordination between different institutions should be laid
down (as in the US).   We further observe that the accountability of antitrust
authorities could deteriorate in the White Paper era.  In order to address this concern,
we suggest that institutional constraints like accountability and independence
standards should be imposed on member states.   Finally, drawing on the US
experience with multiple enforcement, we argue that the role of the Commission
should be as much to manage regulatory innovation (arising from the enforcement
activity of member states) as to resolve conflict.3
Section 1: Introduction and overview
This paper focuses on the de-centralization of enforcement of European Community
(EC) competition law as spelled out in the EC White Paper of April 1999 on
Modernization of EC competition law (hereinafter 'the White Paper').
1
At the outset, it may be worth emphasising what the White Paper does not do.   In
particular, the White Paper does not put into question the allocation of competence as
laid down in Art. 81 of the EC Treaty (ECT),  which is an exclusive competence.  The
Commission through the White Paper simply proposes that competence with respect
to competition policy which has been transferred to the Community could from now
on be exercised by both Community and national authorities (national competition
authorities and national courts).  Consequently, it is inappropriate to subject the White
Paper to Art. 5 ECT (subsidiarity) and to its legal consequences.
The White Paper is thus not concerned with the allocation of competence.  It
reorganises enforcement; what is envisaged in the White paper is a limited work
sharing where the Commission retains the monopoly over individual exemptions (see
§ 92, p 32 – see also Elhermann (2000)).   Some of the implementation
2 of Art. 81 is
entrusted to at least
3 16 players, rather than one.
                                                                
1See, European Commission, The White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles
85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Commission Programme No 99/027, 28 April 1999. We recognise that
there is some complementarity between de-centralization of enforcement and other aspects of the
modernisation contained in the White Paper in particular the treatment of vertical restraints.  In a sense
both endeavours aim to take off some of the burden from DG Comp’s shoulders.  More fundamentally,
the issue of  who will be applying EC competition law is not independent from the design of the laws
themselves.   In what follows, we abstract from this issue.
2 Arguably, rather limited responsibilities are delegated to member states under the current proposal.
3 In each member state, both the antitrust agency and courts could implement Art 81 ECT.4
This paper does not seek to evaluate whether decentralisation of the implementation
of Art.  81 ECT is desirable.  Rather, we analyse how the decentralisation envisaged
in the White Paper would operate.  In particular, we identify two potential sources of
inefficiency associated with the sharing of enforcement among several authorities.
First, and most fundamentally, different authorities might not have the same
incentives in exercising their power; national authorities will indeed not have an
incentive to take into account effects taking place outside their own territory.
Second, different authorities will respond to different institutional constraints and
accountability might operate differently at the national level relative to the EU.
4
We argue that the first concern is potentially quite serious and show that divergent
incentives can have a “ disintegrating effect”,  in particular  given the scope for
simultaneous rulings on single cases offered by the framework currently envisaged
and despite the fact that rulings from individual member states only apply within the
confines of their territory.   In the proposed framework, it is unlikely that member
states will routinely opt for a balancing test whereby they will internalise in their
decisions the interests of other member states (be it foreign consumers or producers as
the case may be).   By contrast, such balancing is guaranteed when the Commission is
in charge.
                                                                
4  In addition, there may be a concern about different levels of competence.  However, incompetence is
hardly a structural issue.    Its effects are likely to be transitory and they do not have a “disintegrating
effect”  (incompetence is, in its crude form, origin-blind).   There may be yet another concern, namely
that regulatory diversity among member states with respect to a number of ancillary but influential
tools for antitrust enforcement might again introduce some inconsistencies across countries.   For a
discussion of this issue and whether as a consequence, some minimum harmonisation is warranted in
this area, the reader is referred to  Kon (1999), Mohr Mersing (1999) and  Forrester (1999).5
In our view, existing legal tools are inadequate to ensure that incentives will be
aligned.  In particular, the duty to co-operate, as laid down in ECT, and Art. 9.3 of
Reg. 17/62 do not sufficiently curtail national discretion.
We suggest that in order to align incentives two additional measures should be
considered.  First, we advocate the re-emergence in the intra-EC context of the
'positive comity' obligation as we know it from the field of co-operation at the
international realm.    Second, we suggest that a procedure for arbitration between
different institutions should be laid down.    This role could be played directly by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) or by the Commission (which itself would be subject
to judicial review).  We discuss the alternatives but emphasise that in any event, the
circumstances where the institution assuming an arbitration role will have the right or
the obligation to intervene should also be negotiated ex ante.
The second concern, namely that institutions will differ across countries is also one
that in our view should be taken seriously.   The design of institutions matters a great
deal in the implementation of competition law.  Unlike other areas where the law is
codified in details, competition law is formulated in general terms and accordingly
leaves a lot of discretion to the implementing authorities
5. Discretion is however
associated with reduced accountability that in turn enlarges the scope for various
forms of capture.  In our view, the case law of the ECJ does not, as the Commission
suggests in the White Paper, provide enough discipline in this respect
6.  As a result of
different institutional frameworks, different member states may thus strike different
balance between the interests of their various constituencies.      In general, whether
                                                                
5 From this perspective, the area of competition is probably not the prime candidate for delegation to
member states.6
accountability at the level of the member states is more effective that accountability at
the Commission level is at best unclear and there are some good reasons to think that
accountability will be reduced in the White Paper era.   In order to address this
concern, it would  useful in our view to impose institutional constraints on the
member states.   These may take the form, for instance, of accountability standards
(like common publication requirements) and standards of independence (for instance
with respect to the status of civil servants or the nomination of competition
commissioners).
To sum up, if the Commission has recognised some of these concerns just discussed,
the White Paper falls short from providing a comprehensive framework to analyse the
underlying issues.   In our view, the sharing of responsibilities that it envisages is
unlikely to work well without important accompanying measures.   The operation of a
network requires a minimum of standardisation and co-ordination.   Standardisation
should focus on institutional constraints and co-ordination should focus on positive
comity obligations and the establishment of procedures for arbitrage.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: Section 2 considers the issue of multiple
enforcement and concludes that the occurrence of simultaneous enforcement by
several members of the network should not be dismissed.   In Section 3, we examine
the consequences of such simultaneous enforcement acknowledging that the members
of the network have different incentives and we show that under the current proposal,
it has disintegrating effects.    In Section 4,  we examine whether the existing legal
framework can address this matter.   In Section 5,  we discuss the institutional
                                                                                                                                                                                         
6 It is not clear in any event that the case law should act as strong discipline.7
constraints under which the national competition authorities (NCAs) and the
Commission operate.  In Section 6, we provide a positive account of the US
experience with respect to multiple enforcement from which useful lessons can be
drawn.    Finally,  Section 7 concludes and collects our suggestions to improve the
operation of the network.
Section 2: Multiple enforcement (the 15+1 scenario)
This Section focuses on the legal parameters that the White Paper envisages for
competition enforcement in the EC.  We first observe that the White Paper is not
subjected to the constraints imposed by subsidiarity.   Second, we show that the White
Paper leads to multiple enforcement.
2.1.  The White Paper and Subsidiarity
As we mentioned earlier, the White Paper should not be viewed as a proposal within
the context of subsidiarity.  The Commission nowhere submits that the question of
competence is prejudged through the White Paper.  The Commission simply adds new
partners to exercise an exclusive Community competence.   This is confirmed by the
fact that it is still the Commission alone that will define the EC competition policy
(and not in some form of cooperation with the member states).
7
Hence, competition policy post-White Paper is a Community competence to be co-
exercised by DG Comp and by the NCAs as well.  This is a substantive innovation in
                                                                
7 See the White Paper at p. 31.8
the sense that institutions (the NCAs) are called to apply a legal instrument which
involves a fair amount of discretion without having formal competence.   Effectively,
under the White Paper, the NCAs operate as administrative units of an EC-wide
executive.  This is the first instance, to the best of our knowledge, in which national
authorities are meant to exercise judgement on behalf of the Community.   The
importance of this reform thus cannot be overstated.
The White Paper, by being insulated from subsidiarity-type considerations (as laid
down in Art. 5 ECT), still ensures that Community action will not be subjected to the
constraints laid down in Art. 5 ECT.  Hence, the Community is unrestrained and can
intervene when it deems it necessary.
8
Finally, the White Paper does not deal at all with issues regarding application of
national competition law.  Indeed, this remains national competence and the White
Paper does not alter the pre-existing paradigm of allocation of competence.
2.2. EC competition law: here, there and everywhere
As well known,  Art. 81 ECT applies to the extent that an agreement 'may affect trade
between member states'.  The ECJ has traditionally interpreted this term  lato sensu.
9
Voices arguing in favour of a restrictive construction of the mentioned clause have
                                                                
8 On whether this conclusion is in itself a problem, see infra Section 4.
9 It should be noted that in US law, the interstate commerce clause has also been interpreted in a wide
sense, the leading Supreme Court decisions being Summit Health v. Pinhas, 500 US 322 and McLain v.
Real Estate Board , 444 US 232.9
remained largely minoritarian
10, whereas the majority of doctrine seems to endorse
the ECJ's conclusions in this respect.
11
As long as the Community is the sole enforcer, the evaluation of whether trade among
member states is affected is purely a Community-wide issue.   For the purpose of
exercising jurisdiction,  the question of which EC countries are involved in the intra-
community trade is simply irrelevant.
However, when national enforcers are involved, the issue is more intricate.  Indeed,
some countries may be unaffected (in terms of trade) and the question arises of
whether they should still be allowed to exercise jurisdiction.  For example, could the
Portuguese NCA assert competence over an agreement between an Italian and a
Danish undertaking which only affects trade between those countries?   In our view,
the answer to this question must be positive.
The Portuguese NCA should not be asked to establish some 'minimum contacts' other
than having satisfied the 'may affect trade between member states'-requirement. The
reason is simply that the White Paper only enlarges the set of potential enforcers
without altering the mechanism that triggers jurisdiction.
Hence, we can, in principle, expect frequent multiple enforcement as several NCAs
can simultaneously assert their rights even with respect to events occurring outside
                                                                
10 See, for example, Wesserling (1997).
11 Ehlermann (2000) concurring.10
their territory.
12   In turn, one could expect interested parties to select enforcers
strategically in order to advance their own interests.
This is sometimes referred to as 'forum shopping', an issue which has been raised but
not fully explored in the literature so far
13.
Instances of multiple enforcement are easy to illustrate.     Imagine a case where
country A and country B assert jurisdiction over the same practice or decide jointly
not to intervene.    This could be for example a case of an alleged horizontal
agreement between Greek and Italian carriers operating in the sea transport sector
between Greece and Italy.
14    Independently of whether the Greek and Italian
authorities intervene or not, Portugal could assert jurisdiction, either because our
preferred interpretation is correct – that is, that any NCA can intervene to the extent
that trade among member states is affected,  or because Portuguese tourists were
charged monopoly prices by the Greek and Italian undertakings at hand.
Of course, multiple enforcement could lead to conflicting decisions
15.   But even in
the absence of conflicts, it is not clear that multiple enforcement will be appropriate,
as the several agencies may lead to an outcome that is undesirable.      These issues
are further analysed in Section 3.
                                                                
12 Even if our conclusion is contested, it is legally impossible to doubt the validity of the statement that
in our example, Italy and Denmark can, in principle, assert jurisdiction based on the 'nationality' clause
and eventually any other member state whose consumers' interests are affected based on the 'effects'
doctrine.
13Compare Ehlermann (2000) and Siragusa (1999).
14Every resemblance to actual cases is completely unintentional.
15It is irrelevant for the purposes of this exercise whether NCAs and the Commission are at equal
footing with respect to the kind of decisions they can take post-White Paper.  As Ehlermann (2000,
p.30) observes, it is most likely the case that NCAs can adopt positive decisions.  What we care about
here is quid in case where two NCAs reach divergent decisions independently of how much they can
decide.11
The extent of conflict and the consequences of multiple enforcement are also affected
by the scope of the decisions that NCAs can take.   According to the White Paper
(§60), decisions by NCAs will have a limited territorial effect in the sense that they
are deprived of any legal effects beyond national boundaries.  This approach can lead
to the following paradox:  a transaction which by definition affects trade among
member states (since otherwise, EC law does not come into play at all) must be
submitted to one NCA knowing ex ante, that no matter what the decision is, it is
binding only within a part of the common market.
As Nehl (1999) points out, in the name of de-centralization, the Commission
effectively puts into question the network concept that it wants to create.  Territorial
limitation can lead to a series of perverse incentives: not to submit to NCAs if EC-
wide protection is sought; outlaw an otherwise valid transaction only within the four
corners of a particular sovereignty;  raise transaction costs to the maximum possible,
since, conceivably, fifteen different outcomes are possible in a particular case.
16
Section 3: The consequences of multiple enforcement
In the previous section, we have argued that (i) member states will not be seriously
constrained in asserting their enforcement rights
17 so that multiple simultaneous
enforcement can be (widely) expected but (ii) that the scope of their decisions will be
limited to their own territories (at least according to what appears to be the working
                                                                
16 Ehlermann (2000), Nehl (1999) and Siragusa (1999) have identified some of the consequences
mentioned here.
17 Assuming arguendo that notifications will be rare in the White Paper era, one can still expect NCAs
to respond to complaints.12
hypothesis of the White Paper).    In this Section, we analyse the consequences of
such a framework for enforcement.
To the extent that national authorities are accountable to national constituencies, it is
natural to assume that they will only consider the interest of those constituencies.  In
other words, national authorities cannot be expected to take into account, in the
evaluation of the cases that they handle,  the effects that are taking place outside their
territory.  Each country will thus consider both the competitive effects and the
potential efficiency benefits that accrue within their own territory.
Since, as discussed above, a number of countries can be expected to assert their
enforcement rights, a likely outcome is one where a number of countries will
simultaneously assess the competitive effects and the efficiency benefits that accrue
within their own territory and adopt a ruling which has effects in their territory.    One
can then wonder whether such an outcome would significantly differ from that
obtained if there was a single enforcer at the EU level.
For the sake of the argument, assume that each country can impose remedies which
meet its own concern without affecting the agreement under review in other countries
(in terms of competition or efficiency benefits).    In such a hypothetical world, the
deal under review is effectively “separable” across countries and it is not clear that a
single enforcer would achieve an outcome which is fundamentally different from that
arising from simultaneous enforcement across countries
18.   Such an authority would
                                                                
18 In the absence of efficiency benefits, the scope for conflicts would also be reduced.  Indeed, when
the relevant antitrust market extends to a few countries,  multiple enforcement by any subset  of the
countries concerned will yield the same outcome as single enforcement by a central authority  (see
Neven and Röller, 2000).13
indeed recognise that each country can be assessed separately and would impose
appropriate remedies in each country.
When remedies in one country affect other countries, the matter is altogether
different.   For instance, assume that a particular agreement only makes business
sense if it can be implemented in all countries.    In such a case, there is indeed a
potential external effect across countries because a negative decision in one country
will effectively prevent the deal from being implemented in other countries where the
deal might possibly bring positive net benefits (i.e. where efficiency benefits
dominate potential anti-competitive effects).    The outcome of simultaneous multiple
enforcement might then differ significantly from that arising from a single EC wide
enforcer.   Consider for instance a deal which brings positive net benefits at the EC
level but such that the balance between anti-competitive effects and efficiency is
unfavourable in one country.  An EC-wide enforcer would, in all likelihood (that is,
observing the Community Interest Clause),  allow (or fail to sanction) the deal.  By
contrast, under multiple enforcement, the deal will be banned (or sanctioned) by the
country which suffers.  Hence, whereas an EC-wide single enforcement allows for
balancing between positive and negative net benefits across countries, multiple
enforcement does not.    In general, simultaneous multiple enforcement also imposes
more numerous constraints than single EC-wide enforcement (net benefits have to be
positive in 15 subsets of the EC and not only at the level of the EC as a whole).   As a
consequence, simultaneous multiple enforcement should be expected to lead to more
prohibition (or sanctions) than EC-wide single enforcement.  It will also be biased
against deals which have an EC-wide scope but have uneven consequences across the14
EC.  From that perspective, simultaneous multiple enforcement will thus have a
“disintegrating effect”  relative to the current situation.
So far, we have considered, following the White paper, that rulings by NCAs only
have effects within their own territories.    It is worth noting that our main conclusion,
namely that simultaneous multiple enforcement can have a disintegrating effect,
remains valid even if this assumption is relaxed.   Indeed, if it assumed that rulings by
NCAs have effects throughout the EC (in a modified White Paper scenario), external
effects across countries will be even reinforced.   In those circumstances, a negative
decision by one authority will always prevent other countries from realising the net
benefits that would potentially accrue to them.
Section 4: Co-operation in the network
So far we have established that multiple enforcement is a real possibility in the White
Paper era and that it could have substantial adverse consequences.   In what follows,
we first consider whether the existing legal framework and proposals in the White
Paper suffice by themselves to address the problem.   We conclude that this is not the
case.
The existing framework is in full mutation.  The duty to cooperate imposed on
member states, and Art. 9.3 of Reg. 17/62, which provides the Commission with the
possibility to intervene when warranted, constitute the existing framework.  In the
White Paper, the Commission proposes an information-sharing system between NCAs
and national courts on the one hand and the Community institutions on the other.15
We take each component in turn.
4.1.  The duty to co-operate (Art. 10 ECT)
One way to avoid non-co-operative outcomes associated with multiple enforcement is
provided by Art. 10 (ex Art. 5) ECT which imposes on member states a duty to co-
operate.    This instrument however appears to be rather ineffective.
Art. 10 ECT imposes a double obligation on member states: a positive obligation, that
is to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty and a negative one,
that is to abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the
objectives of the Treaty.  Lenaerts and van Nuffel (1999, at p. 419) have appropriately
dubbed the duty to co-operate as the ‘federal good faith’.
It is well established that the duty to co-operate contains both a vertical (member state
to Community) as well as a horizontal (member state to member state) angle.  Absent
cases where a member state fails to comply with specific EC obligations, the duty to
co-operate has been interpreted as an obligation imposed on member states ‘to take all
appropriate measures to guarantee the full scope of Community law’ (Lenaerts and
van Nuffel, 1999 at p. 421).
This means that member states (NCAs for the purposes of the present paper) must not
only cooperate with EC institutions responsible for implementing EC law
19 (NCA to
                                                                
19 See ECJ 217/88 Commission v. Germany [1990] ECR I-2879 at §33 p. I-2907.16
DG IV), but also with institutions of other member states
 20(NCA to NCA).  How far
can we construe this obligation to extend to?
We should keep in mind that normally Art. 10 ECT is invoked as an auxiliary basis to
any given claim. By itself, it is thus a rather weak basis to carry a claim.  That is, Art.
10 ECT offers a good argument when the violation of another specific obligation is
alleged.   But there is no such other alleged violation in the context of our discussion.
More specifically, there is no obligation at all that calls for a member state to desist
when another member state has decided to exercise jurisdiction.  Moreover, the White
Paper itself acknowledges the possibility for “forum shopping” which means that the
Commission does not construe Art. 10 ECT so as to impose a duty to desist when
another NCA has been requested to intervene.  It seems fair to conclude that with
respect to the horizontal angle of the duty to co-operate we should not expect too
much when applied in the context of de-centralised antitrust enforcement.
Art. 10 ECT could be helpful when the Commission decides to intervene in a
particular case (vertical angle).  It is by now settled case law that once the
Commission has initiated procedures, and  a fortiori when it has adopted a final
decision, national courts are bound to avoid conflicting decisions if necessary by
suspending proceedings before them.
21.  As the White Paper notes (p. 35) the same
principle could mutatis mutandis apply to NCAs as well.  The duty to co-operate
could serve as an argument for such an endeavour.
4.2.   When the Commission intervenes (Art. 9.3 Reg 17/62)
                                                                
20 See for example, ECJ 165/91 Van Munster [1994] ECR I-4661 at §32 p. I-4697.
21 See C-234/89 Sergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG [1991] ECR I-935.17
According to Art. 9.3 of Reg. 17/62
« As long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure under Articles 2,
3 or 6, the authorities of the Member states shall remain competent to apply
Article 85(1) and Article 86 in accordance with Article 88 of the Treaty ».
The White Paper suggests that, based on this provision, the Commission can, in case
of a final decision by a national institution and subject to res judicata, prohibit an
agreement allowed by national courts (or NCAs);  moreover, in case of a non-final
decision by a national authority, the Commission can intervene and propose its own
preferred solution (the White Paper pp. 35-6).
The Commission has however not bound its discretion in this respect.  No one post-
White Paper knows if, when and under what circumstances the Commission will
make use of its discretion.
This stands in stark contrast with the US approach where the Supreme Court has
indicated under what circumstances it is likely to intervene.  The main drawback of
unlimited discretion,  is that private parties are likely to prefer the security of a
Commission decision.  Ultimately, this would defeat the whole purpose of the White
Paper in terms of decentralisation.  For decentralisation to succeed,  guidance on the
role of the umpire seems necessary.  In other words,  the  institutional credibility of
the NCAs largely depends on the extent to which they follow  the Commission’s18
legacy and firms’ anticipation of this will be greatly enhanced by guidelines on the
circumstances where the Commission would intervene.
Rule 10 of the US Supreme Court addresses the subject of ‘considerations governing
review of certiorari’ and provides a source of inspiration for future EC guidelines in
this respect.  It reads as follows:
« ... Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion.  A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for
compelling reasons.  The following although neither controlling nor fully
measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the
Court considers:
(a)  a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same matter;  has
decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision
by a state court of last resort;  or has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power;
(b)  a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a
way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a
United States court of appeals;19
(c)  a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should not be, settled by this
Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law ».
The US institutional framework still differs from that found in the EC to the extent
that the Commission is not the ultimate umpire as  Commission’s decisions can be
appealed before the ECJ.
What stems from the analysis above is that the existing framework is too weak and
too imprecise.  The ECT was based on the assumption that competition law is
enforced in a centralised manner.  Hence, it did not pay much attention to the vertical
relationship (NCAs to DG Comp).
4.3.  Information sharing
In addition to existing instruments, the White Paper envisages the adoption of a wide
information sharing scheme.   This would certainly help to reduce unintended
inconsistencies in NCAs’ decisions but it certainly does not address the underlying
issue of divergent incentives.20
The argument of course could be advanced that it is anyway (that is, even absent legal
compulsion) in the interest of NCAs, since they are in some sort of repeated
interaction with each other, to ‘internalise’ foreign interests in their decisions.
Practice does offer however examples where co-operation breaks down.
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas may be a case in point, where the EC moved in to assert
jurisdiction without paying much attention to the stated wish of its partner to
exclusively decide the case.   When stakes are high, the incentive to deviate may be
hard to resist.
Hence, it appears that the current legal framework even in conjunction with
information sharing will not suffice to address the undesirable features of multiple
enforcement.
Section 5:  Accountability in the network
As discussed above, allowing several institutions to implement the same rule might
give rise to inefficiencies, even if we abstract from the issue of incentives and
simultaneous enforcement just discussed.    The constraints that institutions will face
in the White Paper era might differ from those prevailing before and accountability
might deteriorate.
Indeed, it has long been recognised that institutions should not be seen as benevolent
and omniscient agents following the mandate that has been assigned to them.   Civil
servants will take decisions in terms of their own objectives (which may include the
objective assigned by the law but also others like career motives) and third parties will21
naturally seek to exert influence on the decision.     The extent to which civil servants
will actually deviate from pursuing the objectives that have been assigned to them,
which is usually referred to as capture, will also depend on the institutional
framework.    For instance, greater accountability should in general reduce the extent
of capture.  Other features like independence will involve more  delicate trade-offs
(see for instance Neven et al., 1992 for a discussion).
In turn, greater accountability will be easier to achieve if the mandate given to the
civil servants is precisely codified.    The implementation of rules can indeed be
verified  ex post relatively easily.  By contrast, the implementation of general
principles which allow for wide discretion is harder to monitor.
Competition statutes in general, and Art. 81 ECT in particular, are formulated in very
general terms and leave a lot discretion to the agency in charge of implementing it.
As a result, accountability is difficult to achieve in the area of competition and it will
be difficult to monitor effectively the operation of several agencies
22.
The issue then arises as to whether accountability will be enhanced as a result of
decentralisation.  The classic theory of federalism suggests that accountability is
greater at local levels of governments.  Yet, there are some reasons to think that this
wisdom may not apply in the case at hand.   First, in the current situation, the
Commission’s decisions have EC wide effect and hence are more likely to attract
attention of the antitrust community throughout the EC.   From this perspective,
                                                                
22 From that perspective, it is rather odd that competition is the first area where multiple
implementation of Community policy is envisaged.   Other areas like agricultural policy or research
and development policy are substantially more codified than competition and should a priori be better
suited to multiple implementation.22
accountability would be  weakened in the White Paper era if NCAs’ decisions have
territorial limitations, since national civil servants will then be more sheltered from
EC-wide scrutiny.
Second, the accountability in front of the judicial system might be weakened.  In the
current system, Commission decisions can be appealed at the ECJ, a court with
experience in antitrust issues, the decisions of which have an EC wide effect.  By
contrast, in the White Paper era, decisions by NCAs might or might not have an EC-
wide effect (as noted above).  In the latter case, they will be, if at all, scrutinised by
national courts, which do not necessarily have much experience in antitrust.
Third,  accountability might be subject to substantial increasing returns.  For instance,
the control which is undertaken by the press or by the academic community involves
substantial fixed costs.   Some countries may be too small to ensure the emergence of
such mechanisms of accountability.
For all these reasons, it may be wise to enhance to accountability of NCAs in the
White Paper era.
Section 6: Inside the US; the 50+1 laboratory
23
Parallels with US experience are sometimes striking and sometimes less so.  In what
follows, we do not recommend an institutional transplant but still suggest that  some
US experience is quite relevant for the present discussion and should not be lightly
                                                                
23 This term was first used by Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co vs Liebermann, 285 US 262,311
(1932).23
overlooked.    In the United States, multiple enforcement occurs notably across
different circuits of the Federal Courts
24.
To illustrate the US approach, we will focus on a simulation whereby two federal
courts are called to judge first on the same issue and then on a comparable issue.
25
Imagine that an undertaking sues another undertaking before two Federal Courts.
Both suits can proceed simultaneously.  One of the parties though can ask to transfer
the case [using 28 USC 1404(a) or 1406(a)].  In such a case the two suits will be
consolidated.  If no such request is tabled, the possibility still exists for a party to
request from the Court to stay proceedings until the other suit was resolved.  In such
case, it is up to the Court to decide whether it will act accordingly or not.  If nothing
from the above occurs, when judgement occurs in one of the two suits it will have
force of res judicata and the winning party on proper motion can dismiss the second
suit.  This is so essentially because judgements govern the actions of the parties in
general not where they are acting.  At least for Federal Courts there is nothing that
limits the force of say a 7th Circuit judgement to the 7th Circuit.  As mentioned
above, the working hypothesis of the White Paper stands in contrast with this
approach.
A similar result can stem from a case where multiple plaintiffs sue the same defendant
before various circuits.  The Judicial Panel of Multi-district Litigation (composed of
                                                                
24 Our discussion here does not focus on state law in the same way that the White Paper is not
concerned about national competition law.  As in the EC architecture, there are State Agencies and a
Federal  Agency.  No formal links are established between the two and co-operation is on a voluntary
basis.  Notwithstanding this though, some rather spectacular outcomes are the result of such co-
operation, the Microsoft litigation being probably the best illustration of the sort.
25 This part of the paper is largely based on discussions with Eleanor Fox and Diane P. Wood.24
federal judges, see 28 USC 1407) can order that the cases be all considered in one
district for pre-trial proceedings.  When litigation reaches the trial stage, it can be
transferred back to various districts.  There is a complicated doctrine, called non-
mutual offensive issue preclusion, under which it is possible that particular facts found
in one case against one party can be taken as established in a later case against the
same party.
Now if comparable cases reach various districts, there is absolutely no guarantee that
they will all end up with the same result.  In fact, Federal Circuits often disagree on
issues of law.  Perhaps the most famous and long-standing conflict was between the
9th Circuit (alone) and everyone else on the question whether market power had to be
shown in a Sherman Act Section 2 attempt to monopolise case.  The Supreme Court
finally granted certiorari and resolved it in Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 US 447
(answer - yes).  As is explained infra, conflicting jurisprudence is top of the list for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
What are the lessons to be drawn from this parallel?  First,  multiple enforcement
occurs in the US.  Arguably, it encourages innovation in interpretation of US antitrust
law and this feature is much valued in US practice
26.    Second,  there is a number of
procedural devices designed to encourage co-ordination between parallel enforcers.
And third, there is a final umpire who plays the important role of providing future
guidance on the basis of diverse and arguably enriched experience.
                                                                
26 As Burns (2000) notes, gains from innovation are particularly beneficial in an area like antitrust
where economic analysis is not always beyond doubt.25
One should however be careful in drawing lessons for the European context.  The
main difference between the US and the EC lies with incentives.  Whereas different
circuits in the US do not have obvious incentives to concentrate on effects taking
place within the territory of their jurisdiction, the same is not true for European NCAs
which respond to domestic constituencies.
Section 7: Improving the network
In the previous sections, we have argued that some co-ordination is required and that
some minimum standards of accountability should be imposed to make the network
operate.
With respect to co-ordination,  two dimensions should be emphasised.   Measures
should be taken first to align incentives of the NCAs and second, to capitalise the
gains from innovations (in light of the US experience).
Positive comity obligations on NCAs is a natural instrument to align incentives and
we would certainly advocate their consideration. Positive comity obligations are
however unlikely to prove sufficient to avoid the negative consequences of multiple
enforcement.     Ultimately,  either a central co-ordination or a formal rule to allocate
jurisdiction will be necessary.
Unfortunately, the second option does not completely address the fundamental
incentive issue.   It does provide some legal security especially if national decisions26
are given an EC-wide effect and parties to the dispute will avoid forum shopping.  But
it does not guarantee that the forum designed will provide a proper balancing between
(eventually) conflicting interests.
Hence, it seems that the role of co-ordination currently envisaged for the Commission
should be formalised.  In particular, the circumstances where the Commission will
intervene should be clarified ex ante.
In our view, the US experience also certainly suggests that the role of central
authority is as much to distil diversity as to co-ordinate enforcement.  Hence, the
focus of the White Paper must shift: instead of focusing solely on co-ordination of
enforcement and  ex ante instruments like information sharing,  the Commission
should pay more attention to ex post instruments designed to ensure that gains from
innovation are properly realised.
The role of co-ordination could be entrusted to the Commission, which would thus
assume a role of primus inter pares in the network.   The Commission’s decisions are
of course subject to judicial review by the ECJ.   Hence, one could wonder whether
the co-ordination should not be left directly to the ECJ.  Rapid action however will
most likely be needed for the umpire to assume the entrusted responsibility.  For this
reason (along with the undisputed competence that the Commission now commands
on antitrust issues) we should rather see the Commission in this position.  And this
solution does not at all set aside the ECJ since eventually some of the Commission’s
decisions will be submitted to its review by dissatisfied parties.27
The Commission could thus provide a procedural vehicle which will function as the
counterpart to Art. 177 ECT:  based on  ex ante agreed criteria (inspired by the
experience of the US Supreme Court), the Commission will move in to consider cases
where incentives of NCAs are grossly inadequate or will provide ‘corrective’ action
when deemed necessary.
Finally, as discussed above,  an adequate operation of the network will require that its
members meet some minimum standards. Hence, we would advocate the introduction
of institutional constraints on NCAs
27.   These may take the form, for instance, of
accountability standards (like common publication requirements). But harmonised
accountability standards may not suffice because, as discussed above, only limited
accountability (ex post) can be achieved in an area like competition.  Hence, it would
seem necessary to impose standards ex ante on particular features of the national
institutions  (for instance with respect to the status of civil servants or the nomination
of competition commissioners).28
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